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There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neurosci-
ence, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self–other interaction is the driving force
behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that human infants are
motivated for social interactions and suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted
in the implicit notion that others are like the self. We then marshal evidence from functional neuroimaging
explorations of the neurophysiological substrate of shared representations between the self and others,
using various ecological paradigms such as mentally representing ones own actions versus others actions,
watching the actions executed by others, imitating the others actions versus being imitated by others. We
suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the
right hemisphere play a special role in the essential ability to distinguish the self from others, and in the way
the self represents the other. Interestingly, the right hemisphere develops its functions earlier than the left.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
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a concept has many definitions and that there is no consensual framework for conceptualizing the
various aspects of the self (for an exploration of various dimensions of the self from a diverse set
of disciplines, see Gallagher, 2000). This complexity exists because self-processes operate at
multiple levels, and different research camps have emerged to address the role of the self at these
levels, but without attempting to integrate them (Robins, Norem, & Cheek, 1999). Instead of
opposing a naturalistic perspective of the self to a social construction, we shall suggest that the
sense of self emerges from the activity of the brain in interaction with other selves. Our formu-
lation will be grounded in empirical evidence ranging from developmental psychology to cognitive
neuroscience and clinical neuropsychology. We will suggest that self–other connectedness is un-
derpinned by a shared representations network, which enables the self to represent the other,
project thoughts and feelings to the other, feel sympathy for the other, and may also account for
psychological identification with others. We will propose that the inferior parietal cortex, in
conjunction with the prefrontal cortex, plays a crucial function in both self-awareness and in
relating the self to others.
There is a long-standing philosophical position arguing that self and other are interconnected.
For instance, in his Treatise of Human Nature David Hume (1739), observed that our minds are
mirrors to one another: They reflect one anothers passions, sentiments, and opinions. This
‘‘sympathy’’ or ‘‘propensity we have to sympathize with others, to receive by communication [the]
inclinations and sentiments [of others], however different from, or even contrary to our own,’’ he
held to be the chief source of moral distinctions.
Contemporary research in developmental science, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience
provides cumulative evidence for a view of similarities in the construction of representations of the
self and others.2. Development of self and other representations
Recent empirical studies in developmental psychology suggest that there exists an innate system
that accounts for early intersubjective transactions between the self and the other. Current em-
pirical evidence radically challenges the traditional views that considered infants as social isolates,
devoid of any intersubjective link between self and other, or as being in a ‘‘normal autism’’ state
until the age of 18 months because they confuse the self and the other (e.g., Freud, 1911).
For instance, an elegant study conducted by Rochat and Hespos (1997) demonstrated that
neonates discriminate between external and self-stimulation. In this study the authors observed
newborn infants when they spontaneously brought one hand to their face, touching one of their
cheeks (self-stimulation), or when the experimenters index finger touched one of the infants
cheeks (external stimulation). Microanalysis revealed that infants responded differently to the two
types of stimulation. Newborns tended to display significantly more rooting responses (i.e., head
turn towards the stimulation with mouth open and tonguing) following external compared to self-
stimulation. Following Neissers (1991) claim that the interpersonal self grows out of the infants
interactions with others, Rochat and Striano (2000) proposed that this interpersonal self develops
via the active process of intermodal perception and exploration, in particular sensory–motor
activity.
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namely the ability of individual organisms to understand conspecifics as beings like themselves
who have intentional and mental lives like their own. This understanding enables individuals to
imagine themselves ‘‘in the mental shoes’’ of another person, so that they can learn not just from
the other, but also through the other. This could be one major difference between human and
other primates. Moreover, human beings ‘‘identify’’ with conspecifics more deeply than do other
primates. By identification, we mean the process by which an individual understands that other
people are beings like herself in a way that inanimate objects are not. Interestingly, almost all
analyses of identification incorporate an explicit notion of psychological inclusiveness, a con-
sideration of how a person thinks and feels the self to be part of a larger grouping. Identification is
distinct from a simple physical grouping. Through this process, each individual forms a psy-
chological bond with others that can exist independently of any physical contact (Deaux, 1996).
Research indicates that we are from birth not only acting and thinking selves, but we also
express an intuitive need to relate ourselves to other people. It has been shown that very young
infants express what Trevarthen (1979) terms intersubjective sympathy, i.e., they are predisposed
to be sensitive and responsive to the subjective states of other people. This can be demonstrated
through several means, including spontaneous face-to-face interaction between infants and their
mothers, and through more specialized ‘‘still-face procedures’’ (i.e., when mothers adopt a neutral
face and stop responding to the infant), which can lead to withdrawal by the infant.
This relatedness with others also manifests in neonatal imitation. Studies conducted by Meltzoff
and Moore (1995) have shown that imitation occurs in infants. Their experiments demonstrate
that newborn infants less than one hour old can imitate facial gestures such as lip protrusion,
mouth opening, and tongue protrusion. Moreover, imitation is still observed after introducing a
delay between the stimulus presentation (by means of a pacifier placed in the infants mouth) and
her response. This rules out reflexes and releasing mechanisms to account for imitation. Meltzoff
and Moore (1995) suggested that this innate capacity for imitation coupled with an implicit ‘‘like
me’’ analogy provides the initial condition needed for developing more sophisticated social un-
derstanding including empathy, perspective-taking, and more advanced forms of theory of mind.
These findings have led Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996) to propose that the understanding of the
other person is primarily a form of embodied practice. We develop and maintain our self-concept
through the process of taking action and then reflecting on what we have done, that is, the sensory
consequences of our actions, and, later in life, what others tell us about what we have done. Thus,
self-concept is not innate, but is developed by the individual through interaction with the envi-
ronment, as well as reflection upon that interaction. On the other hand, what might be innate and
specifically human, following Tomasellos (1999) theory introduced previously and Meltzoff and
Moores (1995) ‘‘like me’’ analogy, and might underpin the building of the self-concept in relation
with others, is the ability to identify with others, to experience that others are ‘‘like me.’’
A great deal of evidence has accumulated in developmental psychology showing that very
young infants can and do distinguish between nonhumans and humans, and preferentially at-
tribute mental states to the latter (Johnson, 2000). For instance, Woodward, Sommerville, and
Guajardo (2001) used a visual-habituation paradigm to show infants simple object-directed ac-
tions. After infants had habituated to an actor reaching for one toy, they saw test events in which
there was a change in either, the relation between the actor and her goal or the path of reach. Six-
month-olds showed a stronger novelty response to test events featuring a change in the actors
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Furthermore, infants propensity to attend to goals seems to be specific to human actors. Indeed,
infants did not attend to the relation between actor and object for events involving inanimate
actors, such as a claw.
Another compelling demonstration of infants special self–other connectedness is illustrated by
studies that show that infants imitate actions of people but not of objects (Legerstee, 1991). This
result has been further explored with the re-enactment procedure used by Meltzoff (1995). This
procedure capitalizes on toddlers natural tendency to pick up behavior from adults, to re-enact or
imitate what they see. Two groups of 18-month-old children were shown either a human dem-
onstrator or a mechanical device attempting to pull apart a dumbbell. However, the human actor
never produced the target action. Rather, he failed to pull the ends of the dumbbell outward, as
one of his hands slipped off the object. Like the human actor, the mechanical device failed to pull
apart the dumbbell, and the pincers slid off the object. Results showed that, although the children
were visually riveted by both displays, the two groups of toddlers significantly differed in their
tendency to reproduce the target act. Specifically children reproduced the target action after
watching the human demonstrator, but they did not do so after watching the mechanical dem-
onstration. Children apparently represent the behavior of others in a psychological framework
involving goals and intended acts, instead of purely physical movements or motions.
Lastly, it was demonstrated that infants imitate things they understand. For example 15-
month-olds are happy to imitate an adult putting a bird to bed, but they are less willing to put a
car to bed, even after seeing an adult do so (Mandler & McDonough, 2000). Therefore, 15-month-
old infants not only represent actions as goal-directed, but seem to be able to have beliefs about
the goal of human actions.
Altogether, these studies establish that human infants are motivated for social interaction, and
suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted in the implicit notion that
others are like the self. These shared experiences are primarily based on perception and action
cycles, which embody the fundamental logic of the nervous system. Indeed, the vertebrate brain
was designed primitively for governing motor activity with the basic function of transforming
sensory patterns into patterns of motor coordination. Herein, as expressed by Sperry (1952), lies a
fundamental basis for the interpretation, direct or indirect, of all higher brain processes including
mental functions. Thus, in relation to perception the motor system plays an elementary role in
social cognition, and intersubjectivity develops out of overt action (i.e., transactions between self
and other).
We will argue, in the rest of paper, that the right hemisphere (especially the inferior parietal
cortex) plays an essential role in self–other connectedness. Interestingly, measurements of cerebral
metabolism in children (aged between 18 days and 12 years) indicate a right hemispheric pre-
dominance, mainly due to the neural activity in the posterior associative areas, and that its
functions develop earlier than the left hemisphere (Chiron et al., 1997).3. Shared neural representations between self and other
The old ideomotor theory (Greenwald, 1970; James, 1890), which states that the perceptual
image or idea of an action initiates performance of the action (or ‘‘thinking is for doing’’), has
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& Bargh, 2001), speech perception (Liberman & Mattingley, 1985), motor mimicry (e.g., Char-
trand & Bargh, 1999), motor priming (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschl€ager, & Prinz, 2000), and
emotional contagion (Sullins, 1991). Another more recent formulation, called the common-coding
hypothesis (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Knoblich & Flach, 2001; Prinz,
1997), states that actions are coded in terms of the perceivable effects they should generate, and
assumes that the representations of intended action effects determine action production and
perception. Thus, perceiving events produced by other individuals activates the same represen-
tational structures that govern ones own planning and control of these actions (Knoblich &
Jordan, 2002).
Recently the notion of shared representation has been used to account for the demonstration
that similar brain areas are activated during mental representation of ones own action, mental
representation of anothers action, and observation of anothers action (Decety & Grezes, 1999;
Grezes & Decety, 2001). Theoretically, we propose that the meaning of a given object, action, or
social situation may be, to some extent, shared by several individuals and thus should activate the
same neural network in their respective brains.
Some theorists have argued that an important requirement for a full understanding of others
action is the ability to imagine performing those actions (Barresi & Moore, 1996). The involve-
ment of common cognitive and neural resources in motor imagery (i.e., mental simulation of an
action while the output is blocked) and motor behavior has received considerable support since
the paper by Decety and Ingvar (1990). Numerous psychophysics experiments have shown that
temporal and cinematic properties of mentally represented actions mimic those of the real rep-
resented events (for a review see Viviani, 2002).
Functional imaging exploration in subjects requested to imagine grasping objects relative to the
visual inspection of the same objects results in the activation of the prefrontal cortex, the anterior
cingulate, the premotor cortex, the inferior parietal lobule, the cerebellum, the ventrolateral
thalamus, and the caudate nucleus in the left hemisphere (Decety et al., 1994). Lang et al. (1994)
reported bilateral activations in the SMA, the precentral gyrus, and the anterior cingulate gyrus
during the simulation of saccadic eye movements. Another study using internally guided motor
imagery of joystick movements reported activations in the medial and lateral premotor areas,
including the SMA as well as the superior and inferior parietal areas bilaterally (Stephan et al.,
1995). A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study found a significant involvement of
contralateral motor cortex (30% of the activity found during actual execution) during a sequential
finger–thumb opposition task (Roth et al., 1996). When asked left/right orientation judgments on
images of a hand presented in their visual hemi-field, subjects cortical response is limb specific
(i.e., activation in the side contralateral to the presentation, Parsons & Fox, 1998). A new study
demonstrated that imagining movements of the wrist influences the kinesthetic sensation of il-
lusory wrist movements in the absence of overt movements (Naito et al., 2002), with corre-
sponding activation in motor cortical areas. This latter result offers a clear demonstration that
imagining an action involves a sensory simulation process, which is internally generated because it
was elicited neither by actual movements nor by peripheral input.
Confirmatory evidence for similarities between neural processes involved in action production
and mental simulation comes from studies of neurological patients, which demonstrate that
motor-performance deficits are reflected in motor imagery. For instance, Dominey, Decety,
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motor imagery tasks involving either side of the body. They reported a selective deficit in motor
imagery, but not in visual imagery, on the affected side that closely matched the deficit in actual
motor performance. Patients with lesions restricted to the parietal cortex were found to be se-
lectively impaired at predicting, through mental imagery tasks, the time necessary to perform
finger movements, in comparison to normal subjects (Sirigu et al., 1996). A similar observation
has been reported in a single case study of a patient with severe ideomotor apraxia who was
selectively impaired in motor imagery while his capacity in visual imagery of objects was spared
(Ochipa et al., 1997).
Unlike the studies on mental simulation that can be carried out solely with humans, the ex-
ploration of the neural correlates of the perception of others actions is carried out in both human
and nonhuman primates. An impressive array of data supports the idea of a common mental code
for perceived actions and action performed by the individual himself.
Electrophysiological recordings in the rostral part of the monkey inferior premotor cortex (area
F5) have indicated that there are neurons that discharge during execution of hand and mouth
movements. Some years later, the same authors discovered that most of these neurons discharge
not only when the monkeys performed an action, but also when the monkey observed the ex-
perimenter making a similar action (e.g., Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti,
Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). Neurons that exhibited such properties were therefore called
‘‘mirror neurons.’’ A subset of these mirror neurons also respond when the final part of an action,
crucial in triggering the response in full vision, is hidden, and can therefore only be inferred
(Umilta et al., 2001). This finding is compatible with the idea that we understand actions when we
map the visual representation of the observed action onto our motor representations of the same
action (for a recent review see Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Neurons sensitive to the sight
of complex body movements and particularly to the detection of where another animal is directing
its attention have also been discovered in the monkey anterior superior temporal sulcus (see
Jellema & Perrett, 2002). However, these neurons do not express motor-related activity, and this
region is not directly connected to the ventral premotor cortex. Interestingly, both area F5 and
STS are linked to area PF located in the anterior part of the inferior parietal cortex, where a
cluster of neurons were recently found to exhibit mirror properties, i.e., motor properties that
match the visual ones (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 2002).
Evidence for a mirror system in human comes from various studies using different neuro-
imaging techniques. Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, and Rizzolatti (1995) demonstrated with magnetic
transcranial stimulation (TMS) an increase in excitability of the motor system during the per-
ception of actions performed by another individual. This enhancement of motor system is se-
lective since it occurred in the muscles that the subjects would use for producing the action
observed. Converging evidence was reported in a study that used EEG cartography during the
perception of different sorts of video movies consisting of objects in movement, animals in mo-
tion, gymnastic movements executed by a person, and still shots (Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux, &
Martineau, 1999). Significant decreases in the a1, b1, and b2 power values of the EEG over the
centro-parietal regions, in both hemispheres, were shown during the perception of human motion
sequences. Their results suggest the specific participation of the sensorimotor cortex during the
observation of human motion. Magnetoencephalographic recordings have also shown activation
of the precentral gyrus during action observation (Hari et al., 1998). More recently, it has been
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in a somatotopical manner, namely watching mouth actions activates the cortical representation
of the mouth, while watching hand or foot actions activates their respective representations
(Buccino et al., 2001).4. The effect of the intention (or to be an agent)
To investigate the role of intention on the activation of the neural network that is activated
during the observation of action, a series of studies performed by our group manipulated the
cognitive strategy of the subjects while watching human actions. In the studies, participants
were instructed to either memorize the action for later imitation or for later recognition
(Decety et al., 1997; Grezes, Costes, & Decety, 1998; Grezes, Costes, & Decety, 1999). When
subjects observed actions for later imitation as compared with passive observation of the same
actions, specific hemodynamic increase was detected in the SMA, the middle frontal gyrus, the
premotor cortex, and the superior and inferior parietal cortices in both hemispheres. A dif-
ferent pattern of brain activation was found when subjects were observing the actions for
recognition purposes. In that case, the parahippocampal gyrus in the temporal lobe was chiefly
activated. There is thus a top-down effect of intention upon the information processing in-
volved in action observation. Observing in order to imitate tunes regions involved in action
generation to a step beyond simple motor resonance, which corresponds to motor preparation
and is likely to involve executive functions subserved by the prefrontal cortex. Note that in all
of these studies, the right inferior parietal cortex was consistently found activated in condi-
tions of observation for later imitation. When conditions of observation of actions were
contrasted with static posture, increased activity was detected in the premotor cortex at the
level of the upper limb representation, a result compatible with the mirror neuron discovery in
the monkey.
Altogether, these studies strongly support the view that action observation involves neural
regions similar to those engaged during actual action production, and that this network may be
modulated by the intention of the observer.
Moreover, this motor resonance phenomenon seems to be selectively triggered by actions that
belong to the motor repertoire of the subject watching them. Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, and
Decety (2000) adapted the apparent motion paradigm, originally developed by Shiffrar and Freyd
(1990), to present subjects in the PET scanner with a human model in different positions. De-
pending on the activation conditions, subjects were shown either possible or impossible biome-
chanical paths of apparent motion. The left primary motor cortex and the parietal cortex were
found to be selectively activated when subjects perceived possible paths of human movement. No
selective activation of these areas was found during conditions of biomechanically impossible
movement paths. Additional support for the involvement of implicit motor knowledge during
observed actions derives from a PET study in which participants were presented with the first
trajectory component of a dot depicting either mechanical, pointing, or writing movements, and
were asked to anticipate the outcome of that dot (Chaminade, Meary, Orliaguet, & Decety, 2001).
As predicted from the theory, perceptual anticipation of human actions resulted in activation of
the cortical areas involved in the covert stages of the corresponding action. Selective activation of
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pointing movements, whereas the left frontal operculum and superior parietal lobule were asso-
ciated with the perception of writing movements.
Taken together, the results of the above-mentioned functional neuroimaging studies strongly
support the view that during the observation of actions produced by other individuals, and
during the imagination of ones own actions, there is specific recruitment of the neural struc-
tures which would normally be involved in the actual generation of the same actions. These
results are clearly consistent with the notion that the perception of bodily movements is
mediated (and maybe even constrained) by implicit motor knowledge (Shiffrar & Pinto, 2002),
and that we may understand the actions of others in terms of our own motor system (Blake-
more & Decety, 2001).
The shared representations model may also be applied to the processing of emotions (Adolphs,
2002). In this model, perception of emotion would activate the neural mechanisms that are re-
sponsible for the generation of emotions. Such a mechanism would prompt the observer to res-
onate with the state of another individual, with the observer activating the motor representations
that gave rise to the observed stimulus, i.e., a sort of inverse mapping. For example, while
watching someone smile, the observer would activate the same facial muscles involved in pro-
ducing a smile at a subthreshold level and this would create the corresponding feeling of happiness
in the observer. There is evidence for this mechanism in the recognition of emotion from facial
expression. For instance, viewing facial expressions triggers expressions on ones own face, even in
the absence of conscious recognition of the stimulus (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000;
Wallbott, 1991). Converging neurophysiological arguments in favor of this model are supported
by the finding that right somatosensory-related cortices are necessary in both expressing and
recognizing emotions (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000). Interestingly, a
single-neuron recording study in neurological patients has shown that there are pain-related
neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that respond both to actual stimulation (thermal
stimuli) and also to the observation of the same stimuli delivered to another individual (Hutch-
ison, Davis, Lozano, Tasker, & Dostrovsky, 1999). Altogether, shared representations at the
cortical level has been found in action, pain processing, and emotion recognition, which would
give us a neurophysiological basis for the operation of social cognition. A recent neuroimaging
study has demonstrated the involvement of shared representations (in both emotion processing
areas, and fronto-parietal networks) when subjects feel sympathy for another individual (Decety
& Chaminade, 2003).
Thus, the concept of shared representations seems well supported by empirical evidence, and
more generally, one may advocate that within a given cultural group, the meaning of a given
object, action, or social situation may be common to several individuals and thus should activate
the same mental code. This code would be mediated by a similar neural network in their respective
brains. There is no reason to see shared representations tapping only pragmatic representations,
because they could also address semantic and affective representations. This would also explain
why we come to understand that others are like us at the psychological level, and extrapolate their
mental states (intentions, desires, and beliefs). This line of reasoning parallels the simulation
theory in philosophy of mind, which maintains that one represents the mental activities and
processes of others by generating similar activities and processes in oneself (Gordon, 1986;
Goldman, 1989).
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Even if others are apparently like us, they are never exactly like us, and under normal cir-
cumstances, we do not confuse others with ourselves. The idea of a common mental code in-
volved in self-initiated (performed or imagined) actions and in perceiving the behavior of others
does not mean an overlap between the two signals. Without a sense of self-awareness (and
perhaps self-consciousness), we will just resonate with one another, become distressed by the
distress of others, and certainly will not be able to consciously represent the other, or feel
empathy for her.
An influential cognitive-developmental model proposes that the monitoring of first-person
information (i.e., self-generated signals) and third-person information (i.e., signals from visual
perception or proprioception), which are both crucial to the normal adults understanding of
social cognition and intersubjectivity, activate an internal intentional schema (Barresi & Moore,
1996). This schema would have the capacity to coordinate first-person and third-person infor-
mation and compute the attribution of action to the self or to the other.
There is much evidence that the prefrontal cortex plays a key role in self-consciousness in-
cluding self-ownership (i.e., it is my body that is moving), and self-agency (i.e., I am the ini-
tiator of the action, thought or desire). These high level functions tap executive functions
resources, including inhibition, which are necessary for the initiation and the maintenance of
nonautomatic cognitive processes (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2001, 2002). Lesions of the prefrontal
cortex may cause dysfunction in self-monitoring and lead to what Lhermitte, Pillon, and Ser-
daru (1986) termed the ‘‘environmental dependency syndrome.’’ We suggest that the prefrontal
cortex plays a central role in coordinating self and other representations by monitoring signals
from executive and sensory regions, and identifying the source of perceptions (internal or ex-
ternal).
Another formulation draws on the concept of internal models that rely on feedback and feed
forward mechanisms (Greenwald, 1970; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). It has been suggested that the
same process used by the forward model to predict the sensory consequences of ones own
movements could be used to estimates intentions from the observation of other persons actions
(Blakemore & Decety, 2001). We will discuss this model further after presenting our work on
reciprocal imitation.6. Reciprocal imitation as a natural paradigm to explore self–other connectedness
One way to empirically investigate both the similarities and differences in the hemodynamic
response in ecologically valid social interactions is to use mutual imitation paradigms. Mutual
imitation is acknowledged to play a central role in infant development of intersubjectivity and
shared motivational states (Hobson, 1989; Nadel & Baudonniere, 1982). Role-taking during early
social interactions between infant and mother are frequent and considered a milestone in the
linkage between their subjective experiences. Moreover, there is good evidence that reciprocal
imitation plays a constitutive role in the early development of an implicit sense of self as social
agent (Rochat, 1999). One should bear in mind that imitation is a molar construct, and a careful
analysis of the subcomponents implicate a whole sequence of molecular processes at work, such as
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or intentionality, representation of the body schema, and action monitoring (Rogers, 1999).1
In reciprocal imitation situations, a similar action is executed by one individual who is watched
and imitated by another individual, after which the roles are reversed. Using such situations in
neuroimaging experiments allowed us to investigate the sense of being the source of our actions
when both the observation and the execution neural networks are similarly activated.
In order to tackle the neural correlates of agency, two positron emission tomography experi-
ments were performed in which the participants were either presented with new actions they had
to reproduce, or freely performed actions that were reproduced on-line by another person. These
studies differed as to the type of action and the visual feedback given to the subjects. The hy-
pothesis underlying these studies was that, in the reciprocal imitation conditions, when the self is
imitating the other or being imitated by the other, both the sense of the moving effectors that
belong to the self [i.e., what Gallagher (2000) called the sense of ownership], as well as the visual
and somatosensory inputs, would be similar and would coincide. The relationship between these
two components would differ however. In one case, one can make oneself the agent of ones own
action (when being imitated), or one can simply be shown how to act by the other (to imitate).
Note than in the two experiments, the behavior can be described as real imitation because the
actions performed are in every case new to the subjects, so that they are compelled to map their
own actions onto the actions of the other.
The first experiment focused on mutual imitation of right-hand object manipulations in order
to build simple constructions (Decety, Chaminade, Grezes, & Meltzoff, 2002). In three conditions,
subjects manipulated the objects while watching an experimenter manipulating the same objects.
The two main experimental conditions corresponded to the two situations of reciprocal imitation,
in which the subjects either saw their own actions reproduced by the experimenter or had to
imitate the experimenters actions. In two other control conditions, the subjects and experimenter
performed different actions and the subjects just observed the experimenters actions. Several
brain regions were involved in the two conditions of imitation compared to the two control
conditions, namely the superior temporal sulcus, the inferior parietal lobule, and the medial
frontal cortex. When the two conditions of imitation were contrasted to the control condition in
which subjects acted differently from the experimenter, a lateralization of the activity in the in-
ferior parietal lobule was found. The left inferior parietal lobule was activated when subjects
imitated the other, while the right homologous region was associated with being imitated by the
other.1 There are many definitions of imitation. Yet, we will probably all agree that imitation is a natural mechanism that
involves perception and action coupling. Where we will probably start to disagree, despite a flurry of interest in
imitation, is whether it is a specific human capacity or whether nonhuman primates share this ability. Here, we take the
stance along with many developmental psychologists that imitation does not only rely on the widely present capacity for
associating sensory inputs with one another and with motor outputs, but that imitation is intentional and effortful. We
do apply strict criteria for the definition of imitation, namely the novelty of the behavior and the similarity of the goal
and of the means to achieve it. Thus, imitation is not a mindless matching behavior, but reflects rather sophisticated
cognitive processing. This is different from other forms of social learning, such as emulation (reproducing the goal
without necessarily replicating the specific actions of the model), or mimicry (the duplication of a behavior without
understanding the goal of that behavior).
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known to be involved in executive functioning (Ferstl & von Cramon, 2002). The pre-SMA was
found to be activated in the condition where subjects selected their actions and saw these imitated
by the other, which is coherent with its role in the temporal organization of internally guided
movements (Tanji, 1994). Taken together, activations in the prefrontal cortex account for the
crucial executive component of imitation (Rogers & Pennington, 1991).
Activation was also detected in the posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus (STG). This
region is known to be involved in the visual perception of socially meaningful body gestures
(Allison, Puce, & McCarty, 2000), and more generally in tasks that require detection of biological
agents, such as perception of biological motion (Grezes et al., 2001; Grossman & Blake, 2001),
and also the perception of speech and human sound movements (Griffiths et al., 1998). This part
of the temporal cortex is an important component in a circuit involved in social cognition (which
through direct and indirect connections receives input from both the ventral and dorsal visual
streams, the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the prefrontal cortices). This cluster of ac-
tivity was found in both hemispheres when contrasting the conditions of imitating and of being
imitated to the condition of self-action. However it was only present in the left hemisphere when
the condition of being imitated was subtracted from the condition of imitating the other. This
lateralization in the STG is an intriguing finding, and may participate in the neural basis involved
in the distinction between first- and third-person information conveyed through the visual mo-
dality. We suggest that the right STG could be involved in genuine visual analysis of the others
actions, while the left region could be concerned with the analysis of the others actions in relation
to the intention of the self.
Since this part of the temporal cortex at the junction with the parietal cortex is involved in the
processing of biologically relevant sensory inputs, one could argue that our interpretation of the
results in the context of the sense of agency is limited to the specific situation of imitation of hand
manipulations of objects, and may not be extended to other situations in which the self is in
control of its actions or controlled by the other.
To further examine the significance of the results of this first study, and to exclude visual
reference to body parts, second neuroimaging experiment was conducted in which subjects were
shown a white screen on which two circles of different colors were moving smoothly (Chaminade
& Decety, 2002). Subjects controlled one of these circles via a computer mouse, and were told that
another person was controlling the other circle. In the two conditions of reciprocal imitation,
subjects were moving their circles with the task to either lead or follow the other person. In a first
control condition, both subjects and the other acted freely, while in a second control condition
subjects observed the actions made by the other. As expected on the basis of the results of the
previous experiment, medial frontal and bilateral inferior parietal cortices were detected in the
contrasts between the two reciprocal imitation conditions and the observation control. In addi-
tion, no activity in the temporal lobe was found to be associated with the two conditions of in-
terest. Visual-processing related areas were activated for the two conditions within the right
intraparietal sulcus, and bilaterally in the lateral occipital cortex when subjects followed the ex-
perimenter. These results demonstrate that, when the body is not seen, the visual association areas
recruited by the task shift from body-recognition in the temporal lobe to object-oriented in the
lateral occipital cortex (Grill-Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001). Another fulfilled prediction
was that the lateralization of the inferior parietal cortex reflected the role played by the subjects in
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menter, and right hemispheric activity when they were followed by the experimenter. Therefore,
the involvement of the inferior parietal lobule can no longer be explained by a visual reference
to the body, and this supports our interpretation of a relation between the lateralization of activity
in the inferior parietal lobule and the sense of agency.
In the two functional imaging studies described above, there was more increase in the left in-
ferior parietal lobule when subjects actions were initiated by the other, and more increase in the
right homologue region when they controlled the others actions. We postulate that: (1) the left
inferior parietal lobule computes the sensory–motor associations necessary to imitate an action
demonstrated by the other, which is compatible with the literature on apraxia (e.g., Halsband,
1998), and (2) the right inferior parietal lobule is involved in recognizing or detecting that the
action performed by the other is similar to that initiated by the self. Therefore the lateralization of
the inferior parietal cortex activity in relation to the sense of agency could be defined in similar
terms as those introduced by Barresi and Moore (1996) in their description of the monitoring of
first- and third-person information, applied to the control of action. The left hemisphere, dom-
inant for the execution of action, is over-activated when the intention comes from a third-person
via the visual modality, while the right hemisphere is more activated when the intention of the self
(first-person), is reflected in an other individual, a third person input. We thus postulate that the
link between the control of action, the first- versus third-person monitoring, and the sense of
agency are related phenomenon involving the inferior parietal lobule in conjunction with the
prefrontal cortex.7. The inferior parietal cortex and the sense of agency
There is plenty of evidence from clinical neuropsychology that lesions to the inferior parietal
cortex in the language-dominant hemisphere are associated with apraxia and aphasia (Freund,
2001). Several authors argued that the different types of apraxia could be ascribed to lesions in the
two systems of motor control, a conceptual system and a production system (e.g., Leiguarda &
Marsden, 2000). The inferior parietal cortex in the dominant hemisphere is part of the conceptual
system. Rothi, Ochipa, and Heilman (1991) proposed that this region would be the cortical lo-
cation where ‘‘visuokinaesthetic motor engrams’’ are stored. This directly parallels the ideomotor
theory introduced previously, and further confirms the role of the left inferior parietal cortex in
associating actions and their sensory consequences. The right inferior parietal lobule subserves
different functions as demonstrated by lesion studies. For instance, unilateral neglect, which has
been consistently associated with lesions in the right inferior parietal cortex (Marshall, Fink,
Halligan, & Vallar, 2002), is described as the inability ‘‘to perceive or conceive the existence of the
left side of somatic and extrasomatic space’’ (Bisiach, 1999). While the left region is involved in
somatic experience in relation to action, the right region seems to also be involved in somatic
experience but related to awareness. It is also associated with body knowledge and self-awareness,
and its lesion can produce a variety of body representation-related disorders such as anosognosia,
asomatognosia, or somatoparaphrenia (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997). Of special interest here, Ra-
machandran and Rogers-Ramachandran (1996) have reported the cases of patients with right
parietal lesions in whom the denial of hemiplegia can extend to the motor deficits of other
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ognizing ones own actions, but also for understanding the actions of other individuals.
The involvement of the inferior parietal cortex in the sense of agency itself is well supported by
an impressive mass of converging evidence in addition to the work reported here, including
neuropsychology (Kinsbourne, 2002), other neuroimaging studies in healthy subjects (e.g., Farrer
& Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; Ruby & Decety, 2001, 2003), as well as a study of abnormalities
in attribution of intention found in schizophrenic patients experiencing passivity phenomena,
which resulted in a dramatic activation of the right inferior parietal cortex (Spence et al., 1997).
Recently, Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, and Seeck (2002) have shown that direct cortical stimulation of
this region in neurological patients induced out-of body experience (i.e., the experience of dis-
sociation of self from the body).
Interestingly, not only the prefrontal, but also the inferior parietal and temporo-parietal areas
have evolved tremendously in humans as compared to nonhuman primates (Passingham, 1998).
The parietal cortex appears roughly ‘‘after’’ vision and ‘‘before’’ motor control in the cortical
information-processing hierarchy (Milner, 1998). It is a heteromodal association cortex which
receives input from the lateral and posterior thalamus, as well as visual, auditory, somaesthetic,
and limbic areas. It has reciprocal connections to the prefrontal cortex, and to the temporal lobes
(Eidelberg & Galaburda, 1984). Note that these anatomical studies were performed in rhesus
monkeys, and we do not know much about its connectivity in the human brain. It remains unclear
whether the monkeys posterior parietal cortex performs similar functions as in humans. And it is
even claimed by some scholars (e.g., Milner, 1997), following Brodmanns work, that the human
superior parietal lobe may be equivalent to the whole of the monkey posterior parietal lobe. There
would thus be no monkey equivalent to the human inferior parietal lobe, or at least, not com-
pletely equivalent.
It has been proposed by Heilman, Barrett, and Adair (1998) that representation of the body
must be continuously modified, updated by expectations (feedforward) and knowledge of results
(feedback). Another similar formulation is that the central nervous system contains internal
models which represent the current and predicted state of the motor system (Frith, Blakemore,
& Wolpert, 2000). To be computed, these internal models need to be able to represent the state
of the body and to be associated, directly or via association cortices, with sensory and motor
cortices. The posterior parietal is indeed connected both to the sensory and to the premotor
cortices, as well as to the limbic system. In this model, the represented state of the body is
updated by computation using the efference copy (a copy of the motor program) as input in a
feedforward fashion, and this updated representation is compared to the real state of the body
using the multisensory feedback as input. As a consequence, this representation maps the re-
lation between the motor program and its sensory consequences. We argue that the inferior
parietal lobule plays a major role in this mechanism in relation to the control of complex ac-
tions, such as hand actions and speech. Based on our results, one simple hypothesis would be
that imitation involves assembling a motor program to match the observed action performed by
another individual, which can also be described as choosing the correct representation or in-
ternal model based on sensory input in order to recruit the corresponding motor program. The
central role of the left inferior parietal cortex in this type of task is clearly supported by
neuropsychological observations, and more recently by the neuroimaging experiments described
in this article.
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The capacity to identify with other conspecifics, considered a prerequisite to feeling sympathy
and empathy (Decety, 2002; Hobson, 1989, 2002; Tomasello, 1999), is a distinctive characteristic
of human beings that other primates apparently do not possess (Povinelli & Giambrone, 1999).
Newborns are innately highly attuned to other people and motivated to socially interact with
others. From the earliest months of their lives, infants are engaged with other people and with the
actions and feelings expressed through other peoples bodies (Hobson, 2002; Rochat, 2002).
Developmental studies have shown that children can infer intentions from movements when the
movements are performed by people, but not by mechanical devices (Legerstee, 1991; Meltzoff,
1995). Consistent with these observations, experiments that examined motor priming effects on
imitation from biological (human) and nonbiological effector system (robot) have shown only the
former to induce such effects (Castiello, Lusher, Mari, Edwards, & Humphreys, 2002).
In one neuroimaging study that used virtual reality, no premotor nor inferior parietal acti-
vation was detected when participants were shown a virtual hand grasping objects (Decety et al.,
1994). This may have been due to the poor resolution of the virtual reality system, which made
it difficult for the subjects to perceive the movements as natural, that is, produced by another
biological agent, and, as a consequence, more difficult to identify with. In other words, their
motor systems did not resonate with the observed ones, as it is the case when the hand is real.
To further test the hypothesis that only the perception of naturalistic actions maps onto existing
action representations, Perani et al. (2001) presented subjects with object-grasping actions
performed either by a real hand or by means of 3D-virtual reality or 2D-TV screen. Results
showed common activation foci in the left posterior parietal cortex and in the premotor cortex,
both for observation of real-hand actions and artificial ones, with greater signal increase for the
real-hand condition. A striking finding was the selective involvement of the right inferior pa-
rietal cortex and the right superior temporal gyrus only in the condition of observation of real
hand actions.
In addition to these accounts, we would like to submit, in light of the neuroimaging experi-
ments reviewed here, and especially in those conditions in which subjects watched their actions
imitated by another individual, that the right inferior parietal lobule plays a key function in the
capacity unique to human beings to identify with others and thus share subjectivities. In terms of
neural mechanism, it could be explained by the automatic activation of the shared motor rep-
resentations in the inferior parietal cortices corresponding to the observed action via the ‘‘re-
versed’’ inverse model discussed earlier (from sensory consequences to the motor program) only
when the sensory inputs emanate from a human agent.
Thus it can be proposed that the human system involved in the perception and understanding
of actions performed by other selves might be based, as postulated in the rest of the chapter, not
only on a direct matching neural mechanism between perception and action, but that it also re-
quires identification with the other, as well as the capacity to distinguish the self from other selves,
and to be aware being the source of our actions (including thoughts and desires). We believe that
such mechanisms are necessary to experience intersubjectivity. After all, as Hodges and Klein
(2001) remind us, what makes humans special is their meta-ability—that is to say, their ability to
go up a level and see the self and other as two distinct members in the category of agents.
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quantitative one. We parallel here the view developed by Povinelli, Bering, and Giambrone (2000)
according to which the emergence of an integrated self–other representational system has oc-
curred relatively recently (during the course of the last 2 million years of human evolution), and
that the intimate psychological relation between self and other is one of the key psychological
distinctions between humans and their closest living relatives.9. Conclusion
In this article we attempted to review functional neuroimaging studies that investigate the brain
mechanisms involved in understanding actions performed by others, imitation, and in sharing
mental states such as intentions and emotions. Mental states that are in essence private to the self
may be shared between individuals. The similarity of activated areas (in premotor and posterior
parietal cortices) between observation of action, mental simulation, and imitation accounts for a
shared neural representation model. However, the mechanisms involved in intersubjectivity
cannot be reduced to this common mapping, neither at the neurophysiological level nor at the
cognitive level. This system is interwoven with self-consciousness, as well as with the phenome-
nological experience of agency. Thus one highly relevant issue, both in neuropsychology but also
from an evolutionary perspective, concerns how the self-versus-other distinction operates within
these shared representations and which neural mechanisms are engaged in integrating and dis-
criminating the representations activated by the self and those are activated by external agents.
Our work suggests the inferior parietal cortex in conjunction with prefrontal areas plays an im-
portant role in how the self relates to other, as well as in the sense of agency.
Finally, it is interesting to note that our ability to represent ones own thoughts and represent
anothers thoughts are intimately tied together and may have similar origins within the brain
(Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000). Thus it makes sense that self-awareness,
empathy, identification with others, and more generally intersubjective processes, are largely
dependent upon the right hemisphere resources, which are the first to develops.References
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